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GENERAL DYNAMICS OOllrORATION (0. Corporation),
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et aI., Appellants; UNI'l'ED STATES OF
AMERICA, Intervener and Respondent.
[L. A. No. 24819. In Bank. Oct. 24, 1958.]

AEROJET-GENERAL CORPORATION (a Corporation),
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et aI., Appellants; UNITED S'l'ATES OF
AMERICA, Intervener and Respondent.
[1] 'laxation-Exemptions-Federal Property-Oontraetors With
United States.-A private contractor's right to use government
property may be the subject of a nondiscriminatory tax measured by the value of the property used, though the economic
burden of the tax falls on the United States.
[2] Id.-Exemptions-Possessory Interests in Exempt Property.A state may impose a tax on a privately held possessory
interest in tax exempt property measured by the value of that
interest.
[3] Id.-Subjects of 'laxation-Personal Property.-With respect
to personal property, the general provisions of Const., art.
XIII, § 1, and Rev. & Tax. Code, § 201, providing that "all"
property not exempt from taxation is subject to taxation,
are controlled by other constitutional and statutory provisions.
[4] Id.-Bubjects of Taxation-Personal Property.-Under Const.,
art XIII, § 14, the Legislature has power to provide for the
taxation of "all forms of tangible personal property" and
"any legal or equitable interest therein," but it has not provided for the taxation of limited interests in tangible personal
property and has not defined personal property as including
a right to its possession, as it has defined real property (Rev.
& Tax. Code, §§ 104, 107).
[5] Id.-Assessment-Valuation-Personal Property. - Although
taxable property may be assessed to a mere possessor (Rev. &
Tax. Code, § 405) and such possessor is required to file a
statement of his possession (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 442), the
[1] See Oal.Jm., Taxation, § 77;
[3] See Oal.Jur., Taxation, § 63;
McK. Dig. References: [1,10,11]
§79(1); [3,4,8,9) Taxation, §43;
14] Taxation, § 159.

Am.Jm., Taxation, § 218.
Am.Jur., Taxation, § 419.
Taxation, ~ 86.1; (2) Taxation,
[5] Taxation, §190; [6,7,12-
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property is assessed at "its full cash value" (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 401) and is listed ou the assessment roll as personal prop- ,
erty, not as a possessory interest therein.
[6] Id.-Assessment-Persons Assessed.-Under Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 012, providing that when a person IS assessed as agent,
trustee, bailee, guardian, executor or administrator, his representative designation shall be added to his name and the
assessment entered separately from his individual assessment.
the assessee is liable for taxes assessed against him only in his
representative capacity.
[7] IeL-Assessment-Persons Assessed.-If property held by n
bailee is tax exempt, any assessment of it would necessarily
be self-defeating since the tax could not be enforced against
the property or its possessor personally, at least in cases where
the bailee's interest in the property could not "be transferred.
[8] IeL-Subjects of Taxation-Personal Property.-From an economic viewpoint a bailee's right to use. tax exempt personal
property may be as valuable as the right to use tax exempt real
property, but possessory interests in tangible personal property
are not taxable property.
[9] IeL-8ubjects of Taxation-Personal Property.-The right to
obtain an economic benefit from the use or possession of property may be a relevant consideration in determining who is
actually its owner for tax purposes in doubtful eases, but the
existence of such right is not controlling.
[10] IeL - Exemptions - Federal Property - Contractors With
United States.-With reference to personal property used in
research and production contracts relating to national defense,
though in one case the government may supply tools and
material already owned by it, whereas in another it requires
the contractor to acquire tools and material that immediately
become government property, and in still another title remains
in the contractor until the goods are delivered and the tools
disposed of, these considerations may not be relevant to the
application of a tax on the use or possession of property, but
they are not irrelevant to the application of an ad valorem tax
on the property itself.
[11] Id. - Exemptions - Federal Property - Contractors With
'United States.-Although in a given ease the impact of a use
tax and a property tax might appear identical, they are not
the same thing, and a property tax on tools and Dlaterial used
in research and production contracts relating to national defense cannot be sustained on the ground that the Legislature
could constitutionally provide for the levy of a tax of equal
amount nnder a diiIerent scheme; to be valid a use or posses-

[6] See Cal.Jur., Taxation, §'169 et seq.; Am.Jur., Taxation,
§ 681 et seq.
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sion tax 'would have to apply to all tax exempt property 80 as
not to discriminate against the prh'ate use or pOl;session of
property oWlled by the United States, and it is for the Legisll\ture, not the court, to determine whether ~uch a nondiscriminatory tax on possessory interests in tax exempt personal prop·
erty should be adopted and to determine the measure of such
tax.
[12] Id.':-Assessment-Persons Assessed-Owner.-A title clause
in a contract vesting title in the United States is not conclusive
of ownership for tax purposes when it appears that the taxpayer retains the essential indicia of ownership or that the
government title is for security only.
[13] Id.-Assessment-PersoDS Assessed-Owner.-In the case of
property supplied by the government and property to which
it took title under cost-plus-fixed-fec contracts providing that
title to personal property acquired by the contractor passed
to the government on delivery to the contractor when purchased by the contractor for performance of the contract, and
when not so purchased, on the allocation thereof to the contract
by commencement by the contractor of processing or use thereof or otherwise, the contractor retaining no beneficial interest
other than the rigllt of use in carrying out its contract, the
contractor neither secured nor retained the essential indicia of
ownership and was therefore not the owner for tax purposes.
This also applied to government property supplied under separate agreements for use by the contractors generally in
performing their contracts and to government property supplied for performing fixed-price contracts.
[14] Id.-Assessment-PersoDS Assessed-Owner.-Under normal
operations the distinction between the treatment of contractoracquired property under fixed-price contracts with the government and government supplied property under fixed-fee contracts is that in the former case the contractor has the right
to dispose of or receive title to property no lODger useful or
necessary in the performance of the contract, whereas in the
latter case the government retains such rights; in the former
the risk of loss is borne by the contractor, and in the latter by
the government. These distinctions are not inconsistent with
the government's ownership of the property during the period
when title was vested in it; placing the risk of loss on the
contractor benefits the government, not the contractor, and is
not by itself inconsistent with government ownership.

APPEALS from judgments of the Sup~rior Court of Los
Augell's County. Vernon W. Bunt, Judge pro tem.- Affirmed.
• A8siped b1 Chairman of J'udieial 00UDCll.
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Actions to recover county and city ad valorem personal
property taxes. JUdgments for plaintiffs and intervener, affirmed.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Gordon Boller, Asoifltnnt County Oounsel, Alfn:c.l Charles DeFlon, Deputy
County Counsel, 'Villiam R. ::MacDougall, James Don Keller,
Distriet Attorney and County Counsel (San Diego), Carroll
II: Smith, Deputy, Ray T. Sullivan, Jr., County Counsel
(Hiverside), Albert E. Weller, County Counsel (San Bernardino), J. Frank Coakley, District Attorney (Alameda),
Francis W. Collins, District Attorney (Contra Costa), Keith
C. Sorenson, District Attorney (San Mateo), Spencer M.
Williams, County Counsel (Santa Clara), Roy A. Gustafson,
Distriet Attorney (Ventura), John B. Heinrich, County
Counsel (Sacramento), Roy J. Gargano, County Counsel
(Kern), Robert M. Walsh, County Counsel (Fresno), Frederick N. Reyland, Jr., County Counsel (Stanislaus), Auten
F. Bush, City Attorney (EI Segundo), Frank L. Perry, City
Attorney (Redondo Beach), Ferdinand P. Palla, City Attorney (San Jose), J. F. DuPaul, City Attorney (San Diego),
Manuel L. Cugler, City Attorney (Chula Vista), and Arlo E.
Rickett, City Attorney (Pomona), for Appellants.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, James E. Sabine,
Assistant Attorney General, Ernest P. Goodman, Deputy Attorney General, Dixwell L. Pierce and R()bert G. Hamlin as
Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellants.
Robert B. Watts, John Conway McDevitt, Gray, Cary, Ames
& Frye, John M. Cranston, Ward W. Waddell, Jr., William J.
Donahue, Hill, Farrer & Burrill, Carl A. Stutsman, Jr., Mark

E. True and Vineent C. Page for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Charles K. Rice, Assistant Attorney General (United
States), Joseph F. Goetten, A. F. Prescott and H. Eugene
Heine, Jr., Attorneys, Department of Justice, Laughlin E.
'Vaters, United States Attorney, and Edward R. McHale,
Assistant United States Attorney for Intervener and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs, General Dynamics Corporation
and Aerojet-General Corporation, brought these actions to
recover county and city ad valorem personal property taxes

I
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for t.hf1 fhw.al YPRr 1953-J954. Thl'y aAA~rt, thRt. they had no
taxable interest in the prollcrty. The Unit.ed States intervened and alleged that the property ass(!ssrd b~longed to it
and that it was obligated by contract to reimburse plaintiffs
for the taxes paid. The trial court entered judgments for
plaintiffs and intervener, and defendants appeal.
On the first Monday in March, 1953, plaintiffs were performing various research and production contracts relating
to national defense. Some were prime contracts with the
armed services, and others were subcontracts. Some were
::fixed-price contracts, and others were cost-plus-a-::fixed-fee
contracts. Aerojet operated its own plant, and General Dynamics operated a plant owned by the United States Navy.
The tax on General Dynamics' possessory interest in this real
property is not in is$ue here.
Under the terms of the contracts, title to all of the personal
property involved was in the United States on tax day. It
comprised tools and equipment used in producing goods or
carrying out research for the armed forces, materials being
fabricated into products to be delivered to the armed forces,
and property held on a standby basis for use in the event of
increased defense research or production.
,
Defendants contend that plaintiffs had taxable possessory
interests in this government-owned personal property. They
now concede, however, that the method of evaluation adopted
by the assessor was erroneous and therefore seek a reversal
of the judgment with appropriate directions for correctly
evaluating and taxing plaintiffs' interests.
[1] It is now settled that a private contractor's right to
use government property may be made the subject of a nondiscriminatory tax measured by the value of the property used
even though the economic burden of the tax faUs on the
United States. (City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. of America,
355 U.S. 489 [78 S.Ct. 458, 486, 2 L.Ed.2d 441, 460] ; United
States v. City of Detroit, 355 U,.s.'466 [78 S.Ot. 474, 2 L.Ed.
2d 424]; United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S.
484 [78 S.Ot. 483, 2 L.Ed.2d 436].) [2] .A. fortiori, a state
lnay stop short of imposing such a tax and impose a tax on a
privately held possessory interest in tax exempt property
measured by the value of that interest. (Kaiser Co. v. Reid,
30 Ca1.2d 610 [184 P .2d 879].) The first question in these
cases is whether the state has done so. '
Defendants contend that there is no logical distinction between possessory interests in r(,:11 alld personal property. They
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that. possessory intert"Rts in real property are taxable

(Dr 1,11: "o.",r.(, lnr. v. Cou1Ify of Bnn Di('40, 45 Ca1.2d 546

L290 P.2d 544] ; Kai.scr Co. v. Rrid, 30 Ca1.2d 610 [184 P.2d
879]; Rev. & Tax. Code, § ]04) and invokf' 1W('.t.ion 1 of·1
article XIII of the California Constitution and Revenue and ,
Taxation Code, section 201, as establishing the same rule with .
respect to personal property.
[3] Section 1 of article XIII provides that" All property
in the State except as otherwise in this Constitution provided,
not exempt under the laws of the United States, shall be'
taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided
by law, or as hereinafter provided. The word 'property,' as
used in this article and section, is hereby declared to include
moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, dues, franchises, and all other
matters and things, real, personal, and mixed, capable of
private ownership. . • ." Section 201 provides that "All
property in .this State, not exempt under the laws of the United
States or of this State, is subject to taxation under this code.' I
With respect to personal property, however, these general
provisions are controlled by other constitutional and statutory
provisions dealing expressly with the taxation of personal
property and interests therein.
[4] Section 14 of article XIII provides in part that "The
Legislature shall have the power to provide for the assessment,
levy and collection of taxes upon all forms of tangible personal property, all notes, debentures, shares of capital stock,
bonds, solvent credits, deeds of trust, mortgages, and any legal
or equitable interest therein, not exempt from taxation under
the provisions of this Constitution, in such manner, and at
such rates, as may be provided by law, and in pursuance of
the exercise of such power the Legislature, two-thirds of all
of the members electcd to each of the two houses voting in
favor thereof, may classify any and all kinds of personal property for the purposes of assessment and taxation in a manner
and at a rate or rates in proportion to value diiferent from
any other property in this State subject to taxation and may
t"xempt entirely from taxation any or all forms, types or
classes of personal property."
Under these provisions the Legislature may provide for
the taxation of "all forms of tangible personal property" and
"any legal or equitable interest therein." We have concluded, however, that the Legislature has not provided for
the taxation of limited interests in tangible personal property.
It has not defined personal property as including a right to

.... "'"
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its possP~<iSion as it bas real property (see R.ev. & Tax. Code,
§§ 104, 107), and this omission reflects not merely a lack of
detail, but a consistent pattern of taxing tangible personal
property as an entity or not at all.
[~] Although taxable property may be assessed to a mere
possessor (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 405; S. & G. GU'1llP Co. v. City
0: County of .san Francisco, 18 Ca1.2d 129, 131 [114 P.2d 346,
135 A.L.R. 595]) and such a possessor is required to file a
statement of his possession (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 442), the
property is assessed at "its full cash value" (Rev. & Tax.
Code, § 401) and is listed on the assessment roll as personal
property and not as a possessory interest therein.- No provision is made for declaring or assessing a possessory interest
in tax exempt personal property. [6] Moreover, section 612
provides that when •• a person is assessed as agent, trustee,
bailee, guardian, executor, or administrator, his representative
designation shall be added to his name, and the assessment
entered separately from his individual assessment." (Italics
added.) The assessee is liable for taxes assessed against him
under this section only in his representative capacity. (County
of Los Angeles v. Morrison, 15 Cal.2d 368, 371-373 [101 P.2d
470, 129 A.L.R. 443].) [7] Accordingly, if the property
held in such capacity is tax exempt, any assessment of it would
necessarily be self-defeating for the tax could not be enforced
against the property or its possessor personally, at least in
cases such as these, where the bailee's interest in the property
could not be transferred.
[8] It is true that from an economic viewpoint a bailee's
right to use tax exempt personal property may be as valuable
as the right to use tax exempt real property. In construing
ad valorem tax legislation, however, we cannot overlook the
historical distinction between real and personal property that
is reflected not only in the statutory provisions but in common
·Revenue and Taxation Code, section 602, provides that the "local
roll lhall MOW:
I I (a) The name and address, if known of the assessee.
"(b) Land, by legal description.
"(e) A. description of possessory interests suffieient to identify them.
[Section 107 confines IUch interests to interests in real property.)
"(d) Personal property••••
I I (e) The eash value of real estate, exeept improvements •
•• (f) The eash value of improvements on the real estate.

. . .

.

.

.

.

.

•• (h) The eash value of possessory interests.
fI (i) The eaah value of personal property, other than intaneiblee.

."
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l1ndrrslllnding of what. sort or intf'rest in property is necessary
to rJlwli ry as }Jropf'rly itself wit.hin the meaning of tax
statutc!;. The distinction was recognized in 1{oiscr Co. v. Reid,
30 Ca1.2d 610 [184 P.2d 879], and it was held in both Douglas
Aircraft CO. Y. EYl"afn, 57 0al.App.2d ::H1 l134 P.2d 15], and
C. C. Moore &- Co., Enginccrs v. Quinl1, 149 Cal.App.2d 666
[308 }>.2d 781], that possessory interests in tangible personal
property were 110t taxable property. Timm Ail'craft Corp. Y.
Byram, 34 Ca1.2d 632 [213 P.2d 715], is not to the contrary
for in that case the court concluded that the taxpayer was
in fact the owner of the funds involved. The Timm case is
consistent with the theory that it is the property rather thau
interests therein that is the subject of the tax, for the tax was
sustained on the ground that the property was owned by
the taxpayer, not the United States.
[9] The right to obtain an economic benefit from the use
or possession of property may be a relevant consideration in
determining WllO is actually its owner for tax purposes in
doubtful cases (Timm Aircraft Corp. v. Byram, 34 Ca1.2d
632, 638 [213 P.2d 715] ; Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Ca1.2d 610,
621 [184 P.2d 879]), but the existence of such right is not
controlling. No one would contend that a warehouseman
was the owner of government property stored with him, or
that a rcpair shop proprietor was the owner of government
automobiles brought to him for repairs, even though their
possessory interests in such government property were profitable to them. In accord with such common understanding, the
assessor himself in the present eases did not assess to plaintiffs
government property supplied to them by the government to
enable them to perform their contracts.
[10] Defendants now contend, however, that it is immaterial who has title so long as the essential economics of the
transaction remain the same. What difference, they ask, should
it make that in one case the government may supply tools
and material already owned by it, whereas in another it requires the contractor to acquire tools and material that immediately become government property, and in still another title
l'emains in the contractor until the goods are delivered and
tIle tools disposed of, if in all three cases the contractor receives
essentially the same compensation for performing essentially
the same services T Although there may be no difference
of practical significance if the contract is carried out as
planned, there may be a vital difff'rence in the event of
breach or termination. (See United States v. Ansonia B/'(u.~

I
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&: Copper Co., 218 U.S. 452, 471 [31 S.Ot. 49, 54 hEel. 1107] ;
In re Read-York, Inc., 152 F.2d 313, 316.) In one case the
government as owner has the right to do with the propert.\·
as it pleases subject only to such limitations as the contract
imposes; in the other it is the taxpayer who has such right
flubjcct only to such limilatiows. However irrelevant such
considerations might be to the application of a tax on the use
or possession of property, they are not irrelevant to the application of an ad valorem tax on the property itself.
[11] Although in any given case the impact of a use tax
and a property tax might appear identical, they are not the
same thing, and we cannot sustain a property tax here on the
ground that the Legislature could constitutionally provide for
the levy of a tax of equal amount under a different scheme.
To be valid a use or possession tax would have to apply to all
tax exempt property so as not to discriminate against the
private use or possession of property owned by the United
States, and it is for the Legislature, not the court, to determine
whether such a nondiscriminatory tax on possessory interests
in tax exempt personal property should be adopted and to
determine the measure of such a tax.
The question remains whether plaintiffs retained such an
interest in any or aU of the property so that they were in fact
the owners for tax purposes despite the clauses in the various
contracts vesting title in the United States. [12] A title
clause standing alone is not conclusive of ownership for tax
purposes when it appears that the taxpayer retains the essential indicia of ownership (American Motors Corp. v. City of
Kenosha, 274 Wis. 315 [80 N.W.2d 863, 367], aff'd 356 U.S.
21 [78 S.Ot. 559, 2 L.Ed. 2d 578] ; C. C. Moore &: Co., Engineers v. Quinn, 149 Cal.App.2d 666, 670 [308 P.2d 781]) or
that the government title is for security only. (Timm Ai,'craft Corp. v. Byram, 84 Ca1.2d 632, 638 [213 P.2d 715], and
cases cited.) Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the terms
of the contracts to determine whether plaintiffs retained rights
in the property inconsistent with its ownership by the United
States for tax purposes.
[18] The title clause of a typical cost-plus-fix ed-fee contract provides that title to personal property acquired by the
contractor passed to the government" (1) in the case of such
property which is purchased by tlle cOllt/'al'1or for 111C performance of this contract, upon dcliv('l'Y to the contractor at
the contractor's plant or at the plant of the supplier on f.o.b.

)
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purchases if the Naval Inspector at the contractor's plant
shall have given his approval or (2) in the case of property not
so purchased, upon the allocation thereof to the contract by
the commencement by the contractor of processIng or use'
thereof or otherwise. Such passage and vesting of title shall
not impair any right which the Government might otherwise
have under this contract, including but not limited to th~
right to reject any supplies hereunder, and shall not relieve
the contractor of any of its obligations under this contract."
After title passed, such property was treated in essentially
the same manner as government property supplied to the contractor directly by the government for use in carrying out
the contract. It 'was to be used "by the contractor for the
performance of this contract or of other contracts with" the
government, and with certain limitations the risk of loss was
borne by the government. The contractor retained DO bent>ficial interest other than the right of use in carrying out its
contract. Scrap or other property no longer needed was sold
under close government supervision and the proceeds applied
to the reduction of payments owing to the contractor from the
government. If the contract was completed or terminated in
whole or in part, property not already delivered to the government was either disposed of as the government directed for
the government's sole benefit or made available for further
use in performing other contracts. The government could and
did remove its property at any time it saw fit, and even if
such removal constituted a violation of the contractor's right
to use the property, it does not appear that the contractor
could prevent it or pursue other than purely contract remedies
for the breach. Throughout pIa:inti1fs' operations under the
contracts the government exercised control fully consistent
with its ownership of the property involved, and the trial
court found on the basls of substantial evidence that its use
was "under the close, direct and watchful immediate supervision and control of the representatives of the United States. "
Accordingly, in the case of property supplied by the government and property to which it took title under the cost-plusfixed-fee contracts, plaintiffs neither secured nor retained the
essential indicia of ownership and were therefore not the
owners of such property for tax purposes.
The foregoing discussion with respect to government supplied property under cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts also applies
to government property supplied uuder separate agreements
for use by the plaintiffs generally in performing their con-

)
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tracts and to government property suppljpd for pprforming
fixed-price contracts.
Contractor-acquired property under fixed-price contracts,
however, is treated in some respects differently, and requires
separate. discussion. Only plaintiff Aerojet had fixed-price
contracts. A typical title clause provided:
.. (1) Upon the payment of any progress payment to the
Contractor under this contract, legal and equitable title to all
materials, assemblies, subassemblies, parts, inventories, work
in process, non-durable tools, completed work and other property acquired, produced or allocated by the Contractor for the
performance of this contract shall vest absolutely in the Government forthwith upon acquisition, production or allocation
by the Contractor of such property for such performance.
Such passage and vesting of title shall not relieve the Contractor or the Government of any of their respective rights or
obligations under this contract, nor shall it affect the responsibility of the Contractor in the event of loss or destruction of
or damage to property.
" (2) Property, title to which is or hereafter may become
vested in the Government under the provisions of this Section
may be (i) incorporated in supplies to be furnished hereunder,
(ii) disposed of by the Contractor as obsolete, worn out, or
damaged, (iii) altered from time to time, (iv) expended in the
production of such supplies. To the extent any such property
is not incorporated in supplies delivered hereunder, or disposed of as obsolete, worn out or damaged, or expended in the
production of such supplies, title to such property shan pass
to and vest in the Contractor when such property is no longer
necessary or useful for the performance of this contract, subject, in the case of termination, to the provisions of the Sections hereof entitled, CTermination for Convenience of the
Government' and 'Default.' "
Under the termination and default clauses the government
could retain title and. assume possession or otherwise direct
the disposition of the property.
[14] Under normal operations the distinction between the
treatment of contractor-acquired property under fixed-price
contracts and fixed-fee contracts was that in the former case
the contractor had the right to dispose of or receive title to
property no longer useful or necessary in the performance of
the contract whereas in the latter case the government retained
such rights; in the former the risk of loss was borne by the
contractor, and in the latter, by the government. These dis-
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tinctions, however, are not inconsistent with the government's
ownership of the property for tax purposes during the crucial
period whcn title was vestcd in it. Placing the risk of loss
on the contractor benefits the government, not the contracto1",
and is not by itself inconsistent with government ownership.
(U1lited States v. Ansonia Brass d': C. Co., 218 U.S. 452, 466467 [31 S.Ct. 49, 54 L.Ed. 1107].) While the property was
still useful or necessary for the performance of the contract it
could only be used in performance of the contract unless the
government otherwise directed, and in practice the government exercised the same supervision and control over the disposal of scrap material under fixed-price contracts as it did
under fixed-fee contracts.
In some respects the problem is the converse of tllat presented in Timm Aircraft Corp. v. Byram, 34 Cal.2d 632 [213
P.2d 715]. In that case title to advance payments made to the
contractor by the government was held to be in the contractor
for tax purposes despite the government's right to reclaim
those funds not necessary for the contract's performance and
the balance of the funds in the event of the contract's termination. Conversely, in the present case, the parties have
provided for the passage of title to materials before the delivery of the finished products, and there is a provision revesting
title to unnecessary materials in the contractor. Just as in
the Timm case, where the contractor received substantial
interests in the advance payments before they were fully
earned, so in this case the government received substantial
interests in the property on making a progress payment, interests it would not have received in the absence of the title
clause. It did not have solely a lien or security interest that
could be defeated by the discharge of the obligation secured
or whose enforcement might entail a sale terminating its
interest in the property. To serve its best interests, the government could terminate the contracts in whole or in part
and take possession of its property, and it could do likewise
in the event of the contractor's default, whether or not such
default constituted a breach of contract. In any such event.
it was not dependent on the performance of the contractor's
obligations to it to protect its riglJts, for the property was
already its.
In American Motors Corp. v. City of Kel1o.~ha, 274 Wis. 315
[80 N.W.2d 363, 366-367], invoked by defendants, the court
interpreted a fixed-price contract similar to the ones involved
here and stated that "the Company's right to acquire [!'nr
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Hself] or dispose of the property [title to whi<>b had passed to
t.he government.] is suhject to no restriclion, the only rPlluirement hf'int:r that II. J1ri"f> for such aeqllisi1ion bf> a~rf>('(l upon
with Ihe Contrading" Officer and 111e amollnt illYo]YC'd I", paill
or l'reditf'tl to the GoycrJ1ment as the Ofti,'C'}' may dired." It
coneluded that "the unrestrIcted right of the Company under
the contract to acquire and dispose of the property and the
risk of loss are elements of ownership inconsistent with the
.vesting of "title in the Government as would render the prop"erty immune from taxation. " The decision in the American
Motors case, however, appears to have overlooked the fact
that the contractor's right to acquire or dispose of the property other than scrap could only be exercised at the option of
the government. Until such option was exercised in favor
of the contractor, it, like Aeroj('t, had no right to acquire or
dispose of government property. Moreover, as point(>d out
above, the mere fact that the risk of loss was borne by the
contractor is not inconsistent with government ownership.
We conclude that plaintiffs were not the owners of any of
the property here involved for the purposes of ad valorem
personal property taxation under present California statutes.
The judgments are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I concur in the affirmance of the judgments
for the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Traynor in the major.
ity opinion and also for the reason that the property here
involved upon which defendants had attempted to levy and
collect taxes was not the property of plaintiffs.
Article XIII of the state Constitution authorizes the taxation of "property." The term "property" in the broadest
meaning is ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to
a thing; the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way,
to possess it, to use it, and' to exclude everyone else from
interfering with it. (Black, Law DictioMry (4th ed. 1951),
p.1382.)
In Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Byram, 57 Cal.App.2d 311, 3]7
[134 P.2d 15], Mr. Justice Bishop says, "A common characteristic of a property right, is that it may be disposed of, transferred to another."
In Yuba River ]>ower Co. v. Net'ada Irr. Disi., 207 Cal. 52],
524 [279 P. 128], the definition of property is given as "the
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exclusive right of possession, enjoying, and disposing of a
thing; it is 'the right and interest which a man has in lands
and chattels, to the exclusion of others' ; and the term is sufficiently comprehensive to include every species of estate, real
or personal."
In view of the foregoing definitions, the property involved
in the instant cases was not property of plainti1fs since it did
not have the attributes as defined above.
Plainti:ffs could not use any part of the property without
the consent of the government. Neither did plainti1fs have
the ownership, that is, the unrestricted right to possess it,
to use it, or to exclude everyone else from interfering with it.
Plainti1fs did not have the power to dispose of it, to transfer
it, to pledge or to hypothecate it. The property, 80 far as
plainti1fs were concerned, had no exchangeable value and did
not go to make up part of plaintiffs' estate. Therefore, since
the property in question was not the property of plaintiffs, it
was not properly taxable by defendants.
Schauer, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied November
19,1958.

